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THE NEXT MINORITY TAKES TO THE AIR:
THE FAA AND CAB REGULATIONS FOR AIR
TRANSPORTATION OF THE HANDICAPPED
ELIZABETH G. THORNBURG
During the last decade, the United States has experienced rising
demands from various groups for equal enjoyment of basic human
rights. Women, homosexuals, and ethnic minorities are working
to achieve equal access to education, jobs, and housing. Recently,
a new minority has arisen. Handicapped people are beginning to
demand what a majority of Americans have long taken for granted:
the ability to get on or off a bus, to fly in an airplane, to get in and
out of a building, to take full part in the community, and to live
independent lives with dignity "In the past, the handicapped have
sat back and let others speak for them. Now there is increasing
militancy on the part of the handicapped themselves. [They] are
the next minority."
Part of this movement emerged as a large volume of letters to
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) which criticized the treatment
of handicapped individuals by air carriers! As a response to this
criticism, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the
CAB each issued a series of new regulations which went into effect
in 1977. Although these regulations were adopted to ensure that
the handicapped would be denied carriage only in the interest of
air safety,' the amendments which were incorporated during the
rulemaking process and the difficulty of enforcement may cause the
new regulations to have little, if any, effect. By examining the gen-
I Kellogg and McGee, The Next Minority, NEWSWEEK, December 20, 1976,
at 74 [hereinafter cited as Kellogg and McGee].
2 David Webb, Atlanta attorney, quoted in Kellogg and McGee, supra note 1.
'CAB Docket No. 23904, at 1 (August 9, 1974).
"42 Fed. Reg. 18,392 (1977). The FAA regulations were issued on March 25,
1977, to be effective on May 16, 1977. The CAB regulations became effective
September 30, 1977.
539 Fed. Reg. 24,668 (1974).
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eral background of the regulations, the amendment process, and
related legal principles, one can see the problems which must be
overcome before any real change in the availability of air trans-
portation for the handicapped will come about.
I. BACKGROUND: OTHER LAWS FOR THE HANDICAPPED
In the 1960's and 1970's, primarily at the behest of vocational
rehabilitation and health professionals," Congress passed a series of
laws requiring that certain facilities be made accessible to the
handicapped. The Architectural Barriers Act" requires public fa-
cilities built after 1968 with federal funds to be accessible to the
disabled. The Rehabilitation Act of 19738 provides that "[n]o
otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall, solely by rea-
son of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied
benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."9 On April 28, 1977,
years after these acts were passed, the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare (HEW) signed into law regulations requiring
their enforcement.
These regulations deal with program accessibility, education, so-
cial services, and employment. Programs which receive HEW fund-
ing must be accessible to handicapped persons. Institutions were
given three years to complete structural changes to their physical
plants to accomplish this end: nonstructural changes were required
to be made by August 2, 1977.11 In the field of education, the regu-
lations direct that no handicapped child may be excluded from a
public education because of disability. In addition, handicapped
students must be educated with non-handicapped students "to the
maximum extent appropriate to their needs."'" At colleges and
other post-secondary institutions, recruitment, admissions, and the
'Kellogg and McGee, supra note 1, at 74.
742 U.S.C. 5§ 4151, 4152 (1976).
829 U.S.C. § 793, 794 (Supp. 1977).
8 29 U.S.C. 794 (1976). Section 793 prohibits employment discrimination
based on handicap by federal contractors.
1042 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977). These regulations took effect June 1, 1977.
"§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Fact Sheet, July, 1977, at 7 (avail-
able from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of the Secre-
tary, Office for Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. 20201).
12 Id. at 2-3.
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treatment of students must be free of discrimination based upon
handicap." Health, welfare, and social service benefits may not be
denied on the basis of handicap, and the services provided the dis-
abled must be equal in quality to those in the institution's overall
program. Equitable standards of eligibility are required.' Employ-
ers may not refuse to hire or promote handicapped persons solely
because of their disability, and reasonable accommodation may
have to be made to the person's handicap."
More recently, the Department of Transportation issued a notice
of proposed rulemaking under the authority of the Rehabilitation
Act." The new regulations, if adopted, will require all federally-
funded airports to take specified measures to aid handicapped
travelers."' All new terminals must be designed in accordance with
standards established by the American National Standards Insti-
tute,1" and must provide jetways or lifts for boarding, telephones
with volume control, teletypewriters for communication with the
deaf, vehicular loading and unloading areas, accessible parking
space, and accessible toilets.'9 Existing terminals will be given three
years to make the necessary structural changes."
Congress also showed its concern with the transportation prob-
lems of disabled city dwellers. The Urban Mass Transit Act
(UMTA) of 1964" declares it to be "national policy" that elderly
and handicapped persons have a right to equal access to mass tran-
"3 Id. at 4.
14 1d. at 5.
I5 Id. at 6.
1643 Fed. Reg. 25,016 (1978).
1" Id. Final comments on these proposed regulations were due on October 20,
1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 30,585 (1978).
1' AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS FOR MAKING BUILDINGS
AND FACILITIES ACCESSIBLE TO, AND USABLE BY, THE PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED,
published by ANSI, Inc. (ANSI A117.1-1961 (R1971)). Copies of these stan-
dards are available from ANSI, Inc., 1430 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10018.
1 43 Fed. Reg. 25,022, 25,027-28 (1978) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. S
27.71).
0 Id. The FAA has published a guide to the facilities for the disabled, current-
ly available in 220 airport terminals in 27 countries. It details parking, exterior
circulation, arrival and departure facilities, elevators, stairs, ramps, doors, air-
plane boarding, rest rooms, telephones, and other services. The brochure, called
Access Travel: Airports, is available free of charge from the Consumer Informa-
tion Center, Pueblo, Colo. 81009.
2149 U.S.C. S 1612(a) (1976).
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sit facilities and mandates "special efforts" in planning and design
to assure such accessibility." Unfortunately, the Act for many years
had no implementing provisions, and mass transportation facilities
continued to be built which the handicapped were unable to use.'
Federal regulations under this statute require the urban transporta-
tion planning process of state and local governments to include
"special efforts" to plan public mass transportation facilities which
can be effectively used by the elderly and handicapped.'" In addi-
tion, new regulations require that all local transit buses purchased
with federal grants after September 30, 1979, be the new "trans-
bus" type, equipped with low floors, ramps for wheel chairs, and
other aids for the disabled."5
II. THE NEW REGULATIONS
A. The Civil Aeronautics Board's Initiative
During the late 1960's, the CAB received an increasing volume
of complaints from disabled persons and groups expressing dissat-
isfaction with air carriers' overall treatment of paraplegics, quadra-
plegics, the blind, and other handicapped persons." It also noted
several informal complaints that carriers had refused to carry dis-
abled individuals although a reasonable interpretation of existing
regulations indicated that they should have been carried."
In response to this criticism of the standards themselves and the
inconsistency in their enforcement, the CAB on October 14, 1971,
issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking, inviting partici-
pation by physically handicapped individuals, organizations repre-
senting the handicapped, government agencies, the airline industry,
and the general public. The object of this notice was to determine
the scope of the problem, to decide whether promulgation of rules
22 Id.
3 There was, for example, an accessibility suit brought against the Urban
Mass Transportation Administration in Washington, D.C., because there were
no elevators for the handicapped in its new subway system. Washington Urban
League, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority, Inc., CA No. 776-72
(D.D.C. 1973).
-23 C.F.R. § 450.120 (1978).
1142 Fed. Reg. 48, 339 (1977), codified in 49 C.F.R. § 609.15 (1978).
",39 Fed. Reg. 29,199 (1974).
" See text accompanying notes 52-54 infra.
2239 Fed. Reg. 29,199 (1974).
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would be appropriate, and if so, to develop proposed rules." After
a review of the comments, the CAB decided there was a need for
clearly defined safety standards for transportation of the handi-
capped and referred the question to the FAA."
B. The FAA Preliminaries
On May 30, 1973, the FAA issued its own advance notice of
proposed rulemaking entitled, "Air Transportation of Handicapped
Persons." Due to the significant public interest in the subject, six
public hearings on transportation of the handicapped were held
throughout the United States."' Comments at these hearings stressed
that the individual's freedom to travel should be preserved, and
many speakers encouraged the adoption of regulations which would
safely maximize the transportation of handicapped persons.'
Based on this response the FAA issued a notice of proposed rule-
making in July of 1974. The proposed regulations were issued pur-
suant to Section 1111 of the Federal Aviation Act7 which author-
izes carriers "to refuse transportation to a passenger ... when, in
the opinion of the air carrier, such transportation would or might
be inimical to safety of flight."' The announced premise of the pro-
posed regulations was that "the carriage of handicapped persons
should be limited in the interest of air safety only when those per-
sons need the assistance of other persons to expeditiously evacuate
the airplane." 5 Accordingly, it was proposed to amend Parts 121
and 135' of the Federal Aviation Regulations to specifically pro-
vide for the carriage of handicapped persons.
2936 Fed. Reg. 20,309 (1971). The Board received 20 comments from or-
ganizations representing disabled persons, five from government agencies, 19 from
disabled individuals, six from miscellaneous organizations, two from scheduled
air carriers, and one each from the Air Transportation Association of America,
the Airline Pilots Association, the Aviation Consumer Action Project, and the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
5'39 Fed. Reg. 29,199, 29,200 (1974).
"42 Fed. Reg. 18,392, 18,393 (1977).
39 Fed. Reg. 24,667 (1974).
3' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended 49 U.S.C. § 1301
et seq. (1976), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
549 U.S.C. S 1511 (1976).
539 Fed. Reg. 24,668 (1974).
'In view of the wide variety of aircraft operated by Part 135 certificate hol-
ders, the regulations under this section require the establishment of evacuation
procedures for the disabled tailored to each carrier's own operations rather than
imposing specific provisions. The section also requires crew member training in
the evacuation of the handicapped.
1979]
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C. The Regulations Themselves
1. Definitions of "Handicapped Person"
A perennial problem in drafting regulations is defining the group
to be protected. The FAA chose to define "handicapped person"
in terms of its own purpose in promulgating the proposed regula-
tions.' The adopted regulations, therefore, define a handicapped
person as "a person who may need the assistance of another person
to expeditiously move to an exit in the event of an emergency evac-
uation." 8 This definition was criticized by former Senator John
Tunney as "so vague and general that anyone from one's grand-
mother to a skier with a broken ankle could be classed as handi-
capped."
39
In the tariff rules which the airlines have adopted pursuant to
the adopted FAA and CAB regulations, carriers have further clas-
sified disabled passengers into two groups: "non-ambulatory" and
"physically handicapped." Non-ambulatory passengers are those
who are unable to walk or who need the help of another person to
walk, but who are otherwise capable of caring for themselves
throughout the flight. ' A passenger who uses a wheelchair "for
convenience" is not considered to be non-ambulatory. 1 A physic-
ally handicapped passenger is a person "with any impairment or
physical disability which would cause such person to require spe-
cial attention or assistance from carrier personnel."'
Some commentators' point to the definition in the UMTA" as
3 See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
38 14 C.F.R. S 121.571(a) (1978).
"' Quoted in Achtenberg, "Crips" Unite to Enforce Symbolic Laws: Legal Aid
for the Disabled, 4 U. SAN. FERN. V.L. REV. 197 (1975).
'Rules 15(A) and 16(H), CAB Rules Tariff PR-6, at 142 (1978) [herein-
after cited by the specific rule]. This tariff was issued September 28, 1978 to be
effective November 12, 1978. The definition cited applies only to two airlines.
See Rule 15(A)(2). Many other carriers, such as American Airlines and United
Airlines, modify this definition slightly. See Rule 16(H), Exception 2.
4 Rule 15(A)(2), supra note 40.
" Rule 16(H), supra note 40. This definition also varies greatly. Two carriers,
for example, define "physically handicapped passenger" as "a person who has a
physical impairment (other than drug addiction or alcoholism) which substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities." Rule 16(H), Exception 1, supra
note 40.
' See, e.g., Achtenberg, supra note 39.
- 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1976). The UMTA definition is not at all controlling
here; its definition has merely been suggested as an alternative to that chosen by
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superior: "any individual who, by reason of illness, injury, age, con-
genital malfunction, or other permanent or temporary incapacity or
disability, is unable without special facilities or special planning
or design to utilize mass transportation facilities and services as
effectively as persons who are not so affected."' This latter defini-
tion is more specific as to the persons in the class to be protected
by the act. It has, in addition, two other advantages over the adopt-
ed FAA definition. First, the UMTA defines handicapped people
in terms of their own characteristics as well as in relation to others. 6
Second, while the adopted FAA definition speaks in terms of ex-
isting conditions, the UMTA definition implies an affirmative duty
to adapt facilities to meet the needs of the handicapped.
Although they were developed in response to complaints from
the handicapped of inadequate access to air travel, the adopted
FAA regulations dealing with the right to carriage are phrased in
an essentially negative manner." One commentator on the proposed
regulations requested that the phrasing be remodeled so as to be-
come an affirmative statement of a carrier's obligation to serve the
handicapped. ' While it was felt that the negative wording was more
appropriate, the agency agreed in substance with the comment that
a carrier has an obligation to provide transportation upon reason-
able request, and that the fact that a passenger is disabled in some
way does not make the request unreasonable. "
2. Pre-Flight Considerations
Closely related to definitional issues is the crucial question of
who may fly and who may not. Before the newly adopted regula-
the FAA. The two definitions are related in that both deal with the transportation
problems of the handicapped.
I Id. Note also the definition in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. S
706(6): "any person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment which sub-
stantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (B) has a
record of such an impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such an impairment."
"4 "It is noteworthy that at a time when in virtually every corner of the globe
those who have been invisible to themselves and to those they once conceived
of as masters now stridently demand the right to define meaning and behavior
in their own terms, the cripple is still asked to accept definitions of what he is,
and of what he should be, imposed on him from outside his experience." Kriegel,
Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim: Some Reflections on the Cripple as Negro, 38 AM.
SCHOL. 412, 413 (1969).
4714 C.F.R. §§ 121.586, 221.38(a)(8) (1978).
4842 Fed. Reg. 43,828, 43,829 n.4 (1977).
49 Id.
1979]
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tions went into effect in May of 1977," certificated air carriers op-
erated under a tariff rule which allowed them to refuse to accept for
transportation any person whose physical condition rendered him
incapable of caring for himself without assistance, unless the per-
son was accompanied by an attendant for the duration of the
flight." In addition, the CAB in 1962 approved an inter-carrier
agreement which provided medical and lay criteria for the interline
transportation of handicapped persons."
The criteria approved in this agreement provided that airlines
would not accept passengers with malodorous conditions, gross dis-
figurement, or contagious diseases." Although variations existed in
the number and type of disabled persons accepted on each flight,
there was some uniformity with respect to those not normally ac-
cepted by most airlines. Those frequently excluded were people
who needed care from a third person, people who could not sit in
a seat and fasten a safety belt, mentally retarded children, infants
less than seven days old, people who required injections en route,
and people who needed to carry supplemental oxygen."
The proposed regulations issued by the FAA in July of 1974
would have changed this situation to some degree. They provided
that carriers could not refuse to carry a person on the basis of a
handicap if the person had a recent written statement from a li-
censed physician to the effect that he or she did not need assistance
to evacuate the plane." Nor could the carrier refuse to carry some-
one solely because that person was blind or deaf."' The proposed
regulations also imposed limitations on the number of disabled per-
sons who could be carried on the same flight. The total number of
handicapped persons carried could not exceed the number of emer-
gency exits, the number accompanied by attendants could not ex-
ceed the number of floor level exits, and only one person on a
stretcher was permitted on any flight.' It was thought that these
50See text accompanying note 4 supra.
5' Rule 15(A)(2), supra note 40.
51 CAB Docket No. 16,614, approved by Order E-19154 (Dec. 31, 1962).
"38 Fed. Reg. 14,757, 14,758 (1973).
54 Id.




numbers limitations would maximize safety and efficiency in the
event of an emergency evacuation."8
The FAA received much criticism of this proposal, particularly
with respect to the requirement of a doctor's statement and to the
numerical limitations." Because of this criticism and the results of
tests conducted by the Civil Aeromedical Institute," the FAA in
1977 completely revamped its proposed regulations. Section
121.586, "Authority to refuse transportation," was substituted for
the above-described provisions.
This section, as adopted, requires that each certificate holder
establish procedures, including reasonable notice requirements, for
carrying handicapped persons on its aircraft. These procedures
must be filed with the FAA district office charged with the overall
inspection of the carrier's operations." The carrier may not refuse
to carry a handicapped passenger on the basis of flight safety un-
less the passenger fails to comply with the notice requirements or
cannot be carried in accordance with the certificate holder's pro-
cedures."2 The proposed regulations were adopted in this form,"
and they therefore give each carrier greater discretion both to agree
and to refuse to carry handicapped persons than did the regulations
as originally proposed.'
The procedures adopted by the airlines in response to the newly
adopted regulations vary, but there are some common factors. Most
carriers require a twenty-four to seventy-two hour advance notice
of the nature of the passenger's handicap and the assistance re-
quired." As under the old tariff rule, some carriers will not accept
2639 Fed. Reg. 24,667, 24,669 (1974).
2942 Fed. Reg. 18,392, 18,393 (1977).
60 See text accompanying note 76 infra.
61 The Administrator may require changes in the carrier's procedures if he
finds it to be "in the interests of safety or in the public interest." 14 C.F.R. S
121.586(c) (1978).
62 14 C.F.R. § 121.586(a) (1978).
6 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
"It should be noted that nothing in these regulations affects the authority
of the pilot in command under 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1978): "(a) The pilot in
command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to,
the operation of that aircraft. (b) In an emergency requiring immediate action,
the pilot in command may deviate from any rule ...to the extent required to
meet that emergency."
"5Rule 16(H), Exception 2(a)(1), supra note 40.
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as passengers those persons incapable of caring for themselves with-
out assistance unless accompanied by an attendant." For example,
three of the airlines refuse to carry those unable to sit in a seat with
the seat belt fastened."
Each carrier has also adopted maximum numbers of non-ambu-
latory passengers without attendants who will be accepted on any
one flight." These vary according to aircraft size and seating con-
figuration. In general, the maximum number of escorted and un-
escorted non-ambulatory passengers is either the number of floor
level exits or the number arrived at by counting the seating rows on
the aircraft, minus the number of exit rows, times the number of
aisles."
A different portion of the proposed regulations dealt more direct-
ly with the safety of the handicapped passenger. Proposed Section
121.571 (a) (3) stated that before and after each takeoff "an in-
dividual briefing of each [handicapped person] and his attendant,
if any, shall be made concerning the procedures to be followed in
the event of an emergency evacuation."" There were, however,
a number of criticisms of this proposal. It was thought that the pro-
posed regulation was not sufficiently specific as to the content of
the briefing and that a briefing would be annoying to both passen-
gers and crew at each leg of a long flight on the same airplane."
The regulation which was adopted2 was therefore clarified to
provide that flight attendants should brief handicapped passengers
on the proper route to the exits and the time to move, and should
inquire as to the most appropriate manner of assisting the person
so as to prevent pain and further injury." Further, the adopted
regulations state that a person who has been given a briefing on a
previous leg of a flight in the same aircraft need not be rebriefed
if the flight attendants on duty have been informed of the most ap-
propriate manner of assisting the handicapped passenger."
" Id.
67 Rule 16(H), Exception 2(a)(ii)(bb)(2) and (ff)(2), supra note 40.
6 Rules 15(A)(2), 16(H) Exception 2(b), supra note 40.
Id.
" 39 Fed. Reg. 24,667, 24,668 (1974).
142 Fed. Reg. 18,392, 18,393 (1977).
1 14 C.F.R. § 121.571 (1978).
-a14 C.F.R. § 121.571(a)(3-4) (1978).
414 C.F.R. 121.571(a)(4) (1978).
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3. In-Flight Procedures
The regulations originally proposed by the FAA were quite spe-
cific in indicating the proper seat locations for disabled passengers.
They could not sit in the two seats nearest an exit; if they sat in
a row adjacent to an exit, they were required to sit in the farthest
seat from the exit in that row.' The Civil Aeromedical Institute
(CAMI), however, was employed to evaluate the proposed regula-
tions. It carried out simulated aircraft evacuations using individu-
als with actual handicaps, alone and in groups of persons without
handicaps. The tests were designed to determine which seat loca-
tions should be recommended for the disabled.
The results indicated that the proposed regulations, especially
with regard to non-ambulatory persons, would not be appropriate.
Due to the variety of design in aircraft interiors, more flexible plans
for seating the handicapped were needed. CAMI also examined
carrier accident files for the years 1961 to 1976 and found no refer-
ence to significant delays in evacuations created by handicapped
persons. "' The seating requirements were therefore eliminated from
the regulations as adopted. Most airlines have provided in the tariff
rules only that disabled passengers must agree to sit in seats- desig-
nated by the carrier."
A related issue is the proper position for the seatback once the
handicapped passenger is shown to a seat. Before the advent of the
newly adopted regulations, Section 121.311 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations required all seats to be in an upright position for take-
offs and landings."8 The FAA, in its proposed regulations, amend-
ed the requirement to permit persons who were unable to sit erect
for medical reasons to place seats in a reclined position for takeoff
and landing so long as the seat back did not obstruct any passen-
ger's access to the aisle or to any emergency exit.' Although one
commentator objected to this proposed regulation, the FAA be-
lieved that a reclined seat back would not be an obstruction if the
disabled person were seated in the last row before a partition, and
I Proposed § 121.584(b)(2). See 39 Fed. Reg. 24,667, 24,669 (1974).
7142 Fed. Reg. 18,392, 18,393 (1977).
77 Rule 16(H), supra note 40.
78 14 C.F.R. S 121.311( 1978).
"'42 Fed. Reg. 18,392, 18,393 (1977).
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so the regulation was adopted as proposed."
A third proposed regulation relating to the in-flight convenience
of handicapped passengers dealt with crutches and canes. The pro-
posed regulations required that these devices be stowed where they
would be readily accessible.' This proposal received favorable
comment, but CAMI research indicated that the use of a crutch or
cane in an emergency could lead to delay; handicapped passengers
in the simulated evacuations moved faster using seatbacks for sup-
port. Also, canes and crutches were found to damage evacuation
slides. 2 The proposed regulation, therefore, was eliminated, and
canes and crutches will be stowed, pursuant to the existing regula-
tions, in the same way as other carry-on luggage."
One final regulation that was adopted is an added requirement
for crew members. Their emergency training must now include in-
structions on the evacuation of persons who may need the assist-
ance of another person to move quickly to an exit." Other than this,
the FAA felt it unnecessary to propose changes in emergency evac-
uation procedure.85
As an additional guideline for airline crews, the FAA has issued
an Advisory Circular"8 based on information gained from the CAMI
research and from comments on the proposed regulations. The cir-
cular indicates which attitudes of flight attendants have disturbed
handicapped passengers in the past. It points out that the average
handicapped passenger may need little, if any, assistance and will
be able to tell the flight attendant the manner in which he or she
can best be helped. The circular also discusses nine different types
of disabilities and suggests the most thoughtful and efficient way of
assisting persons so affected."7
-"14 C.F.R. § 121.311(d)(2) (1978).
8 t Proposed § 121.589(d). 39 Fed. Reg. 24,667, 24,669 (1974).
8842 Fed. Reg. 18,392, 18,394 (1977). Because of vociferous protests from
the handicapped, the FAA is reconsidering these rules restricting the use of canes.
CAMI will restudy the possible hazards presented by canes, and the FAA will
examine the use of folding canes. See 238 Av. DAILY 14 (1978).
- 14 C.F.R. S 121.589(a) (1978).
"14 C.F.R. S 121.417(b)(3)(iii) (1978).
8242 Fed. Reg. 18,392 (1977).
88 FAA Advisory Circular No. 120-32, March 25, 1977.
87The categories are: (1) persons with limited endurance, (2) persons with
arms or legs in a cast, (3) persons lacking muscular control, (4) persons with
paralysis of arms and/or legs, (5) persons affected by stroke, (6) blind persons,
COMMENTS
D. The Civil Aeronautics Board's Reaction
In accordance with the CAB's earlier decision to issue a tariff
rule once the FAA had developed safety standards, the CAB issued
a notice of proposed rulemaking on August 9, 1974." This notice
proposed the adoption of a regulation that would require that all
tariffs applicable to the transportation of physically handicapped
persons conform to the forthcoming FAA regulations. The propos-
al emphasized that no provision of the CAB's regulations should be
construed to permit a carrier to refuse transportation to a handi-
capped person other than under circumstances governed by the
new FAA regulations."
The new FAA regulations, in their final form, were issued on
March 25, 1977, to be effective May 16 of the same year. The CAB
therefore felt it appropriate to take action on its notice of proposed
rulemaking, and adopted its tariff rule exactly as it had been pro-
posed in August of 1974.* In so adopting the tariff rule, the CAB
set out its understanding of the manner in which the resulting ar-
rangement between the FAA and the CAB will operate. Under
FAA rules, the carriers have a duty to provide the FAA with pro-
posed procedures for dealing with handicapped persons, and these
procedures will be reviewed to determine their consistency with
safety and the public interest. 1 Thus, the regulations and proce-
dures which will ultimately become tariff rules under the primary
(7) deaf persons, (8) elderly persons, and (9) persons who have had laryngec-
tonies. The circular also gives instructions in dealing with guide dogs and lists
sources of crew-training information.
8839 Fed. Reg. 29,199 (1974).
89 Id.
91 For certificated air carriers, the rules and regulations relating to the
transportation of persons who may need assistance to evacuate the
aircraft during an emergency. All such provisions shall be in con-
formity with Part 121 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
C.F.R. Part 121), as amended or revised from time to time: Pro-
vided, That no provision of the Board's regulations issued under this
part or elsewhere shall be construed to permit the filing of any tariff
rules limiting or conditioning a carrier's obligation to provide trans-
portation and services in connection therewith upon reasonable re-
quest therefor to a person who may require assistance of another
person in expeditiously moving to an emergency exit of the aircraft
in the event of an evacuation, except as provided for in said Part
121.
14 C.F.R. § 221. 38(a)(8) (1978). This regulation became effective on September
31, 1977.
91 14 C.F.R. § 121.586 (1978).
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jurisdiction of the CAB will have been first reviewed for safety and
fairness by the FAA.
The CAB noted, however, that the duty of carriers to provide
air transportation on a nondiscriminatory basis is so fundamental
that it is not relinquishing its responsibility to suspend any rule that
is in violation of the public interest standards of the Federal Avia-
tion Act." In fact, the CAB exercised this authority. A number of
certificated carriers had proposed amendments to Rules 15 and 16,
which control the authority of airlines to refuse to transport pas-
sengers, to become effective November 28, 1977." The CAB did
not approve these regulations as filed, and informed the airline in-
dustry that the rules as drawn were "too indefinite and too confus-
ing in their organization to be accepted under CAB regulations" '
since the resulting confusion might lead to misinterpretation and
misapplication. It was stressed that the rejection was not to affect
the manner in which service is currently provided to handicapped
persons, nor did it relieve airlines of the obligation to file an amend-
ed tariff." In the fall of 1978 the carriers filed their revised regula-
tions, in a somewhat less confusing form. These became effective
on November 12, 1978."
While it did not disapprove the 1962 inter-carrier agreement set-
ting out criteria for the carriage of handicapped persons,' the CAB
did note that many of the agreement's provisions must be recon-
sidered in light of the newly adopted FAA rules." At a minimum,
the agreement will have to be amended to reflect the fact that no
disabled or handicapped person can be denied transportation on the
grounds of disability other than when done in accordance with the
newly adopted FAA rules." Certain provisions of the agreement,
such as the requirement of continued acceptance of an interline
passenger who has commenced his journey, are believed by the
CAB to be in the public interest and will therefore be preserved.' °'
9242 Fed. Reg. 43,828, 43,829-30 (1977).
"Rules 15 and 16, supra note 40.
9Civil Aeronautics Board Press Release No. 77-209 (November 30, 1977).
9 Id.
"Rules 15 and 16, supra note 40.
97 See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.




A final matter considered by the CAB in its rulemaking process
was the fare to be charged for attendants accompanying handi-
capped passengers and for disabled persons on stretchers."' Several
commentators argued that requiring handicapped passengers to pay
for an attendant required by the airline was unjust and unreason-
able."' In such cases, they said, free or reduced-rate transportation
should be provided. Certain of these commentators also contended
that charging multiple fares for carriage of stretcher passengers was
unjust.103
The CAB met these complaints with two arguments. First, it did
not believe the practices to be unreasonable as the handicapped
passenger or attendant would merely be paying for the capacity ac-
tually used. '" Second, the CAB contended that offering reduced-
rate transportation to attendants would violate the Federal Avia-
tion Act."' Section 404 (b) of the Act prohibits carriers from grant-
ing any person any undue or unreasonable preference or advan-
tage and from subjecting any person to unjust discrimination.'"
This section has been construed to prohibit preferential rates cre-
ated to further broad social policies unless those policies are spe-
cifically included in the Act.' Accordingly, the CAB ruled that
the economic needs of the handicapped could not justify a reduced
fare as any such reduction would be based solely on the status of
the passenger rather than on the cost of transporting him.
1 8
In response to this situation, Congress amended the Federal Avi-
101 The Board, in its advance notice of proposed rulemaking, asked interested
persons to answer two questions: (1) "Is the charging of a full fare to an at-
tendant accompanying a disabled person unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory,
and if so, what fare or charge should be paid by such attendant?" (2) "Are the
current air carrier tariffs, which provide for the charging of multiple fares for
a stretcher passenger, unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory, and if so, what
fare or charge should be paid by such passengers?" CAB Docket No. 23,904, at




'- 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1976). Ironically, it is this same section which, by
prohibiting discrimination, mandates the carriage of the handicapped.
' Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967).
142 Fed. Reg. 43,828, 43,830 (1977). The Board cited its recent decision
in Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., Senior Citizens Standby Fares, CAB Order 76-9-147,
September 28, 1976, at 7 as further support for its decision.
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ation Act to allow reduced-rate transportation "on a space-available
basis... to any handicapped person.' '.. The House Committee on
Public Works and Transportation noted that this amendment will
remove the presumption of unlawful discrimination.. and allow
the CAB to approve reduced fares for the handicapped if the fares
meet the economic tests generally applied to discount fares."' The
CAB issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to define "handi-
capped" for the purpose of this statute."" The definition proposed,
based on the HEW definition adopted for the purpose of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973,"' included "any person who has a physical
or mental impairment (other than drug addiction or alcoholism),
which substantially limits one or more major life activities."1 "
Based on the comments it received from air carriers and the
handicapped themselves, the CAB modified its proposal slightly
before adopting the new regulations. First, because five carriers
complained that the breadth of the definition posed formidable ad-
ministrative difficulties, the CAB will not require airlines who
choose to offer reduced rates to the handicapped to adopt the
CAB's broad definition."' A new provision was therefore added to
the regulation: "[A] carrier's rules need not entitle all passengers
falling within the Board's definition of handicapped to reduced
fares, if the differences between the CAB's definition and the scope
of the carrier's rules are reasonably related to the carrier's adminis-
trative needs.""... Second, the CAB clarified the meaning of "re-
quired attendant" for reduced fare purposes. Explaining that the
109Act of Nov. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278, 1281.
"'See text accompanying notes 105-107 supra.
I H.R. REP. No. 95-15, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5184-85.
"143 Fed. Reg. 8266 (1978) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 223.1).
11329 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). See note 45 supra.
11443 Fed. Reg. 8266 (1978) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 223.1). The CAB
definition of "handicapped" is very different from the provisions of the FAA
safety regulations which determine who may fly and who may not. See text ac-
companying notes 38-49 supra. The CAB explained that "[t]he rules proposed
here are not intended to modify or otherwise affect those safety-related tariff
rules, of course, but are rather intended to apply to those handicapped persons
who may . . .be safely carried in accordance with the carrier's rules on that
subject." Id.
"'43 Fed. 38,378, 38,379 n.6 (1978) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 223.11).
'Is Id.
COMMENTS
term should be interpreted broadly,11 ' the new regulation defines
attendant as "any attendant required by a handicapped passenger
in order to travel, whether or not the attendant's services are re-
quired while the handicapped passenger is in an aircraft. 11. If the
airlines choose to avail themselves of these amended provisions,
some airfare relief should be available to all handicapped persons.
III. ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS
The new regulations, if conscientiously enforced, might improve
the ability of a handicapped person to secure air transportation.
Other regulations for the benefit of the disabled, however, have met
with substantial enforcement problems, and the new FAA regula-
tions may share the same fate. One problem is the sheer cost of
adaptation and enforcement. HEW, for example, estimates the cost
of applying its new guidelines at $2.4 billion by September 1,
1980. ' Other estimates have run as high as $10 billion.'* The cost
of adapting mass transit equipment such as buses with lifts to make
them accessible to the disabled will be more than $6,000 per vehi-
cle. 1 The total estimated capital cost of making airport terminal
facilities accessible under the new regulations is $40 million.'"
Enforcement of most laws protecting the handicapped has prov-
en difficult. Many such laws have administrative remedies which
are either bogged down or nonexistent.'" One federal judge, for
example, ruled that a handicapped plaintiff had no cause of ac-
tion under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, holding that the ad-
ministrative procedures specified in the act were intended by Con-
gress to be the exclusive remedy." Yet the Labor Department offi-
cials who are to administer the Rehabilitation Act by December of
11143 Fed. Reg. 38,379 (1978) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. S 221.3).
18Id.
119U. S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 9, 1977, at 84.
120 Id.
121 Dennis Cannon, Special Consultant on Handicapped Matters, Los Angeles
Rapid Transit District, quoted in Achtenberg, supra note 39 at 175, n.37.
12 43 Fed. Reg. 25,041 (1978). For a detailed breakdown of these costs
see id. at 25,043.
121See text accompanying notes 124-25 infra.
1214 Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 202-03 (N. D. Tex. 1977). But
see Drennon v. Philadelphia General Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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1976 had disposed of only 904 of the 1,853 discrimination com-
plaints they had received.'
Often the implementing provisions for congressional acts are
much delayed. The board which oversees the Architectural Barriers
Act of 1968 was not created until 1973,"' and the administrative
regulations for that act's enforcement were not implemented until
June 1, 1977. The rules requiring air terminals to be accessible to
the handicapped were not proposed until five years after the Re-
habilitation Act on which they were based was passed. '
Another enforcement problem revolves around the scarcity of
private rights of action under the Federal Aviation Act. The new
FAA regulations were enacted as safety regulations. The Third Cir-
cuit recently ruled that no implied private action exists for a viola-
tion of FAA safety regulations resulting only in economic injury." '
The court concluded that the safety provisions of the Act were in-
tended to protect passengers and crew members and those on the
ground who might be endangered by accidents resulting from un-
safe aircraft."9 It does not seem that this purpose will justify a suit
on behalf of a handicapped person who has been denied transport-
ation.
A handicapped plaintiff might fare better under the discrimina-
tion section of the Act. First he must exhaust his administrative
remedies. One who feels that the Act is being violated may seek an
order from the CAB compelling future compliance. 3 ° This order,
however, will be prospective in nature and will not remedy viola-
tions which have already taken place."' If the CAB's order is un-
satisfactory, a handicapped passenger may seek review in a federal
court of appeals.13" ' Failure to enforce the discrimination provisions
of the Act results in preference of one class of passengers to the
125 Kellogg and McGee, supra note 1, at 74. These figures reflect the situation
in December of 1976.
128 Id.
127 See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
121 Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1976), noted,
44 J. AIR L. & CoM. 190 (1978). See also Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975).
129 548 F.2d at 458.
1-49 U.S.C. S 1482(a) and (c) (1976).
131 Id.
13249 U.S.C. 5 1486 (1976).
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prejudice of others, and it thus harms the travelling public. A person
seeking review of the action of the CAB in allowing discriminatory
refusal to transport, therefore, would be acting in the interest of
the public and for the protection of a public right.' This public in-
terest has been held to give standing to challenge discriminatory
treatment in transportation,"' and it is possible, under this ration-
ale, that an organization created to benefit the handicapped might
also have standing to challenge discriminatory denial of trans-
portation.1"
Even if standing to sue is granted, another barrier remains to
private enforcement of the new regulations: the cost of litigation.
It costs, for example, from $10,000 to $20,000 in attorney time
alone to research and bring a major mass transit case as far as the
demurrer stage."' Airline cases would require similar expenditures
due to the novelty of the legal issues and the need for multiple ex-
pert witnesses in the fields of medicine, engineering, and aviation.
The cost barrier becomes even more insurmountable when the
handicapped person also has a low income. This is often the case,
as many of the disabled are underemployed (ironically, this is often
due in part to transportation difficulties)."'
It is unlikely that this problem will be alleviated through court-
awarded attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court has ruled that under
the "American rule" the prevailing party may recover attorneys'
fees only against a party who has acted in bad faith or where such
a recovery would spread the cost to those persons benefitting from
the suit." ' Otherwise, attorneys' fees are to be awarded only where
Congress has made specific and explicit provisions for them!1" The
183 Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466, 475 (5th Cir.
1967).
l4 Id.
11 See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See also United
Handicapped Federation v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977).
138 This is figured at the modest rate of $30 per hour. See Achtenberg, supra
note 39, at 204 n.154.
137 Id. at 176 n.39. Whereas 71% of the non-handicapped between the ages
of 17 and 64 have jobs, only 36% of the handicapped of that age group are em-
ployed.
"'8Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 245
(1975).
139 Id. at 260.
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Court specifically rejected arguments, that allowance of fees would
deter future violations; it also refused to award fees where the
plaintiffs had acted as "private attorneys general" to promote ad-
herence to the law in question. '4 Even associations representing the
handicapped are therefore unlikely to be able to recover attorneys'
fees from a defendant shown to discriminate against the handi-
capped.
141
IV. ALTERNATIVES: A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT?
At one time, legal theorists speculated that, even absent regula-
tions such as those just issued by the FAA, the handicapped could
look to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment"
to protect themselves against government-sanctioned discrimina-
tion.14 ' Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, make it unlikely
that the handicapped would succeed in a challenge based on this
provision. Equal protection analysis comes into play when some
activity involving state action uses a classification; it involves a
comparison of whether the state can lawfully do one thing and not
another. Ordinarily, the command of equal protection is only that
the government must not impose differences in treatment "except
upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object
of regulation."" This rational relationship requirement is satisfied
fairly readily: the courts do not demand a close fit between classi-
fication and purpose.1 '
In addition, there are two circumstances in which a stricter stan-
dard is applied. The first, and most universally accepted, is usually
14'0Ma. The only possibility of a change in this area would be for Congress to
make a specific provision for the award of attorney fees. After the Alyeska deci-
sion, for example, Congress passed a law allowing the recovery of attorney fees
in tax litigation where the taxpayer has been harassed by the Internal Revenue
Service, and for certain suits under the Civil Rights Acts. 42 U.S.C. S 1988 (Supp.
1977). In 1978, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to add a section allow-
ing attorney fees in suits brought under 29 U.S.C. §5 793 and 794. Act of Nov. 6,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (to be codified in 29 U.S.C. § 795).
'41 See Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health Serv. Corp.,
559 P.2d 716, 719-20 (Colo. App. 1976).
'42 U.S. CONST. art. XIV.
"
4 See Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights
of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEo. L. J. 1501 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note].
'
T Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
115G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 657 (9th ed. 1975).
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referred to as the "suspect classification." The justification for more
demanding analyses in these cases stems from Chief Justice Stone's
opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Company... which
stated that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to pro-
tect minorities, and.. . may call for a correspondingly more search-
ing judicial inquiry.". Traditionally, the classifications treated as
deserving of intensified scrutiny have been those based on race,"
national origin," " alienage,"* and, to a lesser degree, illegitimacy"'
and gender.'
Some writers have suggested that a classification which distin-
guishes handicapped from non-handicapped individuals should
likewise be suspect." They argue that the handicapped as a group
are saddled with such disabilities, subjected to a history of such
purposeful discrimination, and relegated to a position of such po-
litical weakness as to require special protection. ' The stigma of
inferiority, which has proven so important in some race cases,'
is also present in the situation of the disabled. Another similarity
stems from the fact that the basis of discrimination (the handicap)
is often an unalterable trait." The Supreme Court, however, has
not accepted this argument and it is unlikely that it will do so. Re-
cent opinions seem to have adopted a "this much but no further"
approach to equal protection and have refused to expand the
boundaries of the suspect classification strand of analysis." '
146304 U.S. 144 (1938).
47 1d. at 152 n.4.
18 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
149 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). But see Foley v. Connelie, __
U.S. -, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978).
15Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
"' Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
'
9 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
I-'Kriegel, supra note 46.
14Note, supra note 143, at 1518 argues that the thirteenth amendment and
42 U.S.C. S 1981 (1976) also protect the handicapped.
1"9Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"'The importance of this factor was suggested in such cases as Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 631, 650 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"5'Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender); Mathews v. Lucas, 427
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The second group of cases in which a heightened degree of scru-
tiny is applied involve classifications which impinge on fundamen-
tal rights and interests. Of greatest importance to the rights of
handicapped travellers is the line of cases which has held the right
to interstate travel and the right to use instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce to be fundamental under the Constitution." 8 The
Court has not ascribed the source of this right to a particular con-
stitutional provision; it is felt to be part of the very nature and
structure of the federal union." '
In the past, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to laws which
infringe this right to travel. If this mode of analysis is used, the
government would have to show a compelling interest in the en-
forcement of its restrictions on the handicapped's right to travel.
Lately, however, the emphasis of the Court's analysis has been
changing from this absolutist approach. It now appears that the
majority uses a kind of balancing test, under which the state's in-
terest in the restriction is balanced against the individual interests
of those whose right to travel is infringed.' This standard lowers
the burden somewhat for the public transportation company which
excludes the handicapped and makes a successful challenge by the
disabled would-be traveller more difficult.' In any case, the equal
protection approach can only be implemented where the exclusion
is done by publicly-owned companies or by private companies with
such significant ties to government that their activities constitute
state action."'
U.S. 495 (1976) (illegitimacy); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (alien-
age).
158 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
"'United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966).
'*Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 419 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" In Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp.
394 (N.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977), the
court rejected out of hand any equal protection claim based on the right to travel.
"Plaintiff cannot credibly maintain that access to public transportation facilities
is a 'fundamental right' . . . ... Id. at 398. The court therefore applied the "ra-
tional basis" test and upheld the city's refusal to provide bus transportation for
those in wheel chairs.
' The activities of airlines, because they are so extensively regulated and
because the government participates in them to such a great extent, may constitute
state action. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973); Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). But see
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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V. CONCLUSION
Statutory and constitutional law offer only limited protection for
the rights of the handicapped. The newly adopted FAA regulations
are a case in point. Part of the difficulty lies in the rulemaking pro-
cess itself. It took almost six years from the time of the CAB's origi-
nal notice of intent to issue rules for the final regulations to become
effective. In addition, the requirement that the handicapped be car-
ried was watered down in the progression from proposed to final
regulations.163
When the regulations were issued, compliance did not follow "as
the day the night." Even in the face of a CAB directive that the tar-
iff rules filed with it could restrict transportation of the handicapped
only in conformance with FAA safety rules,1' some airlines tried
to impose additional limitations on the carriage of disabled passen-
gers. Some carriers, for example, have announced that they will
refuse transportation to anyone who cannot occupy a cabin seat in
an upright position,'" despite the fact that the FAA specifically
rejected this requirement.'"
Should the regulation tangle be straightened out, enforcement
problems may easily arise. First, there may be a problem establish-
ing the existence of a private right of action under the regula-
tions.' Second, the new regulations, like other laws aimed at the
handicapped, may be interpreted as "symbolic laws."'1". These laws
are sometimes said merely to declare national policy or to set out
administrative guidelines rather than to provide a private remedy.'9
Because of such constructions, litigation under the laws for the
handicapped has proven difficult. Even when they get past the de-
'6 Compare proposed Section 121.584(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 24,667, 24,668 (1974)
with 14 C.F.R. § 121.586 (1978). James Gashel, Washington representative for
the National Federation of the Blind, terms airline procedures for carrying the
handicapped "unacceptable" and foresees "years in the courts" as the blind seek
redress. Karr, Handicapped Starting to Make Gains In Drive to Use Public
Transportation, Wall St. J., March 22, 1978, at 17, col. 1.
16414 C.F.R. § 221.38(a)(8) (1978).
'"Rule 16(H), Exception 2(a)(ii)(aa), supra note 40.
'"642 Fed. Reg. 18,392 (1977); 14 C.F.R. § 121.311(d)(2) (1978).
167See text accompanying notes 128-33 supra.
166Achtenberg, supra note 39, at 161-62.
'See Bohlke v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway & Transp. Dist., Memorandum
and Minute Order No. 73362, at 3 (Marin Co., Cal. Super. Ct., May 9, 1975).
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murrer stage, cases such as those in which the plaintiff seeks access
to mass transit systems have not fared particularly well. A Wash-
ington judge held that it was neither a violation of Washington's
state anti-discrimination law nor of the federal Constitution to fail
to provide mass transit facilities for the disabled."' A federal dis-
trict court in Alabama ruled that the Urban Mass Transit Act did
not require installation of facilities for those in wheelchairs, pro-
vided that some effort had been made by the transit authority to
make it easier on the walking disabled. In response to an equal pro-
tection argument, the court found no unconstitutional deprivation
and discrimination provided the plaintiffs were not prohibited from
riding on the bus."' It concluded, rather, that any lack of equal ac-
cess came from the transit authority's failure to affirmatively pro-
vide vehicles designed for the disabled and that such affirmative ac-
tion was not required."'
What protection, then, is left for the handicapped? Little remains
besides a moral imperative to recognize the rights of the handi-
capped as human beings. If laws are to be interpreted as mere ex-
pressions of national policy, at least the policy exists. Although
some airlines may seek to restrict air travel opportunities as much
as possible, others may accept the challenge to develop their duty
to serve the public in this new context. Some have already done so.
The CAB may seriously enforce its announced policy that no dis-
crimination based on handicap alone will be permitted in airline
tariffs. Most important, the handicapped themselves are becoming
an increasingly vocal and cohesive minority. The disabled are re-
fusing the invisibility thrust over them by a society made uncom-
fortable by their presence and are demanding the simple right to
move from place to place, an essential element of personal liberty."'
It is to be hoped, then, that interpretation and enforcement of the
new FAA and CAB regulations will be such as to further rather
than to frustrate that search for freedom.
"I Martin v. Seattle King County Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, No. 795,806
(Wash. Super. Ct., King County, filed June 30, 1975).
"7 Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Authority, 407 F. Supp.
394 (N.D. Ala. 1975), afl'd without opinion, 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977).
172 Id.
173 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 231 (Jones ed. 1916).
